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CHAPTER ONE 
This paper is a study o£ £igurative language and speech play 
in £irst grade children. I will describe what types o£ 
£igurative language the children use and comprehend and discuss 
the role o£ £igurative language, and speci£ically metaphor, in 
speech play. I will emphasize the need to study children's 
language using anthropological methods as a separate entity £rom 
adult language. In this chapter, I will present a survey o£ the 
literature concerning children's speech play and £igurative 
language, 
work. 
and then I will provide a brie£ introduction to my 
The investigation o£ £igurative language in children dates 
£rom the work o£ two psychologists, Asch and Nerlove (1960). 
They coined the expression "double-£unction" £or terms which 
"re£er Jointly 
Nerlove: 47) 
to physical and psychological data." (Asch 
These were considered an "elementary instance 
and 
o£ 
metaphorical thinking." (Asch and Nerlove: 48) Using standard 
psychological testing techniques on three to twelve year old 
children, they explored the developmental sequence in acquiring 
understanding o£ these terms. They posited that 1) physical 
obJect re£erence is learned £irst, 2) psychological sense is 
learned a£ter that, and 3) the dual relation can then be 
understood. They £urther suggested that this last stage is only 
£ound in the nine year olds and older, and that this age group 
still lacks understanding o£ the meaning o£ the double £unction. 
These £indings have set the stage £or £igurative language 
investigation over the past two decades. The idea that has had 
the greatest in£luence on more recent studies is the 
developmental sequence o£ metaphoric competence. Asch and Nerlove 
did not assign metaphoric capabilities until adolescence. They 
conclude that nine to twelve year olds have the 
comprehension of double £unction terms ; however, 
capacity £or 
they claim 
that: "There was no evidence that they had been aware in the past 
of the double function." (Asch and Nerlove: 53) In other words, 
these children could identify the double function, but they did 
not do so on their own. Asch and Nerlove's conclusions have been 
re-examined; in fact, it has been through this process that their 
study has been most beneficial. Another aspect o£ particular 
note is that the Asch and Nerlove study only explored the 
comprehension o£ £igurative language. It is necessary to 
distinguish between comprehension, production, and explication of 
£igurative language. 
In the mid-seventies the interest in children's £igurative 
language was revived. In £act, children's language has Just 
become a study in its own right; as psychologists have become 
more interested in child development, child language has also 
become an interest. From there came the realization that 
children's language is more than Just the study of developmental 
stages o£ adult language. 
Howard Gardner has been foremost of the psychologists and 
educators in the field o£ metaphoric development. Along with his 
colleagues of ProJect Zero at Harvard University, he has done a 
number of studies, focusing on child metaphor. Every testing 
situation is a forced, unnatural environment, as a test is not a 
part of everyday interaction. Using a test to discover the use 
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and comprehension of figurative language may not be entirely 
accurate: the sUbJect is forced to adhere to the rules of the 
test which may alter or affect the responses, because the 
questions are interpreted (by the subJect) to fit the test. 
Gardner recognized a bind in Asch and Herlove's test as it 
required a "fixed choice", and thus Gardner provided a more open 
test with both multiple-choice questions and open blanks. 
However, even Gardner's studies were necessarily forced simply 
because they provided a formalized testing situation. 
One of Gardner's earliest studies (1974) on three-and-a-
half, seven, eleven-and-a-half, and nineteen year olds concerned 
prOJecting polar adJectives (e.g. light/dark, happy/sad) onto 
different domains in terms of various modalities (e.g. auditory 
and visual ones) by matching adJectives and domains. It was 
found that the capacity for matching exceeded the ability to 
rationalize those matches. This is an important distinction and 
indicates a progression that holds true for general metaphoric 
and figurative language ability. Gardner suggested that the 
basis for metaphoric thought develops by about four years, 
although this does not mean that children at that age are capable 
of using this ability in everyday conversation. 
Gardner's study later that year (Gardner, Kircher, Winner, 
and Perkins 1974) did work out some of the methodological 
problems of the previous study. In this study, seven, eleven. 
fourteen, and nineteen year olds, and three-to-four year olds in 
a shortened version, were asked to complete similes and to 
choose appropriate ones from a set for a given context in order 
to determine production abilities and preferences. The section 
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concerning appropriate metaphor choice consisted of choosing from 
four different endings for each story: one literal (non-
metaphoric) , 
unoriginal) , 
one conventional (appropriate but familiar and 
one metaphorically appropriate, and one 
metaphorically inappropriate. The two older groups performed 
similarly: conventional and appropriate responses were preferred 
about equally, and conventional endings were the most commonly 
produced. The results for the younger age groups are more 
interesting as they do show a scheme for metaphoric development. 
The pre-schoolers were simply probably made choices at random; 
the seven year olds tended to choose literal endings and produced 
conventional responses; 
conventional endings. 
the eleven year olds strongly preferred 
The eleven year olds were generally able 
to support these endings with rationales that showed 
understanding; the seven year olds were not able to 




conventional. This was credited to time constraints and to the 
fact that it was a new and unusual task. Gardner here presented 
the term "blue-pencil ability', which is what the younger 
children lacked-- the ability to distinguish fine lines of 
appropriateness. 
Although this was an extensive and well-produced study, I 
still question some of the methodology. For one thing, Gardner 
still confined himself only to the terms used for adult 
metaphorical language. Also, the literalness or concreteness of 
the school age children cannot Just be written off as following 
Piagetian stages of behavior but should be further explored. 
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Pollio and Pollio (1973) explained that the Asch and Nerlove 
study was not only too di££icult and binding, as Gardner 
described, but also the double £unction terms that they used were 
"£rozen or dead." (1973: 186) This common term £rom adult 
language studies re£ers to metaphors that have been so overused 
and become part o£ the regular lexicon that they are no longer 
considered real metaphors. Pollio and Pollio gave composition, 
multiple sentence, and comparison tasks to third, £ourth, and 
£i£th graders in their study. They distinguished between £rozen 
metaphors and novel or original metaphors. They suggested that 
£rozen and novel metaphor output was not necessarily related. 
This is an important point to keep in mind in children's language 
studies. Pollio and Pollio also emphasized the di££erence 
between production and comprehension, which was born out by the 
results: while the number o£ metaphors produced in the 
composition test deClined over the grades, the number increased 
in the comparison task over gradesJ and there were £ar greater 
novel £igures than £rozen £igures used in the comparison task. 
They concluded that "using £rozen £igures is probably irrelevant 
to whether or not a child can think metaphorically and, by 
extension, creatively." (1973: 199) 
Yet, I would argue that one cannot assume that £rozen 
£igures are not relevant to metaphorical thinking. For one 
thing, the category o£ "£rozen" is not clear cut. I do consider 
some £rozen elements as standard lexical items and thus not 
important to metaphor competence or use studies. 
children seem to call attention to £rozen £igures, 
However, the 
to use them, 
in a sense as puns, and in that way they seem to highlight their 
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metaphoricity more than adults do. This is related to another 
important point, which is the problem with calling these £igures 
"£rozen" at all in terms o£ children's language. Again, these 
terms £or adult metaphorical language, while they £orm a 
convenient classi£ication structure to talk about children's 
£igurative language, are not relevant or use£ul to children's 
£igurative language studies. 
Richard Billow, £ocusing on cognitive developmental aspects 
o£ metaphor, took a purely psychological approach in contrast to 
the above researchers who tried to move away £rom the standard 
psychological theories: Billow based his work on Inhelder and 
Piaget's (1962) categorization o£ cognitive development, 
including the concrete operational thought stage (about seven to 
eleven years) and the £ormal operations stage (about eleven years 
on). Gardner (1982) provided a good, concise introduction to 
this theory. He described the concrete stage as when a child can 
view obJects £rom more than his own perspective and can change 
between his own and another's perspective (1982:8). This is in 
contrast to the later, more developed £ormal operations stage, 
when the early adolescent child (and then the adult) can not 
only switch perspectives, but can also ·per£orm mental actions 
upon symbols as well as physical entities." (1982:9) The 
concrete stage is also associated with literalness and thus this 
Piagetian scheme is o£ten used in explaining supposed £igurative 
language use decline in early school years. But these stages are 
theoretical inventions, and the correlation o£ language use and 
acquistion to this behavioral and cognitive sequence is also open 
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to question. 
Nevertheless, Billow associated these two developmental 
stages with two different "types· of metaphor which he viewed as 
classificatory behavior: the concrete stage with similarity 
classification and the formal operations stage with 
proportionality classification. His study of five to fourteen 
year old boys attempted to discover the comprehension level of 
these two types of metaphor. Although Billow credited the 
children with understanding earlier than had been previously 
assumed (i.e. less than seven years), he maintained that Inhelder 
and Piaget's explanation of developmental behavioral and language 
stages applied to metaphorical comprehension. For example, 
Billow suggested that proportional metaphorical performance was 
in some way related to formal operation acquisition. 
In two studies of his other studies, Gardner explored 
metaphorical development in younger children, from eighteen 
months to five years. "The Development of Figurative Language" 
(Gardner, Winner, Bechofer, and Wolf 1978) contains the most 
comprehensive survey of this literature, which includes those 
mentioned above. 
this paper, it 
Although this study is not directly relevant to 
establishes metaphoric usage in the form of 




it relates to children younger than those I 
study done by Winner, McCarthy, and Gardner 
worked 
(1980) 
revealed some interesting methodological problems in studying 
language in young children. A problem for the examiner or 
researcher is the difficulty in distinguishing between a real 
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metaphor and one that is simply the only (alternative) term that 
is known for an obJect. This has also been an important issue in 
ape language studies. Winner. McCarthy. and Gardner distinguish 
between action-based and perceptually-based metaphors. the former 
occuring among the youngest age group. the latter among the four 
and five year olds. Action-based metaphors are "resemblances 
perceived among obJects in the child's environment constructed 
out of the pretend actions of symbolic play· and stress the 
importance of its occurence on both the ·verbal and gestural 
planes". 
children 
(1980: 358) Later in the developmental process. 
use non-action, perceptually-based metaphors for 
"renaming obJects· without the need for action; these metaphors 
thus occur in ·spontaneous speech" (1980: 358). Although these 
distinctions are aimed at speakers younger than my subJects, they 
may be more valid and useful than the adult categories that are 
so often used. The concept of categorizing the metaphor by 
situational context and use. rather than by the amount of use the 
metaphor has had (which adult metaphorical terms are based on) is 
preferable. In contrast to other studies (Loban 1963, Billow 
1975. Gardner, Kircher. Winner, and Perkins 1975). which present 
a decline in metaphoric production in elementary school children. 
the Winner. McCarthy, and Gardner study does not find a ·dramatic 
decline in metaphoric production under experimental 
conditions. "(1980: 358) 
I have presented. as have many of the researchers 
themselves, some of the difficulties in using the psychological 
approach to figurative language study in children. I have also 
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briefly presented the issue of children's language as a separate 
study from adult language, which most of the current studies take 
into consideration. Children's metaphor is in a different form 
than adult metaphor and is more closely related to figurative 
language and especially to speech playas a whole. As such, it 
is an important part of children's culture, and hence a prime 
subJect for an anthropologist. Gardner especially tried to 
expand the boundaries of his studies beyond the psychological or 
educational testing situation, but he stopped short of an 
anthropological study. There have been anthropological studies 
done on various aspects of children's language even cross-
culturally (Watson-Gegeo and Boggs 1977, Kernan 1977, Mitchell-
Kernan and Kernan 1975, Edelsky 1977), But we must first explore 
the issue of play and speech play in general to understand the 
anthropological focus of children's figurative language study. 
On the one hand, what adults call metaphors are less common 
and more special in children's language than an adult's common 
spouting of clich~s and proverbs, but on the other hand speech 
play in general is also more common (and creative) among 
children, or at least a more intrinsic part of a child's 
interactions and activities. 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett rephrased (reframed) Todorov's 
statement about literature where "linguistic signs are not 
instruments of communication but important in their own right," 
(1979:223) This is speech play. Speech play is 'carried on for 
its own sake" (1979: 221); it contrasts the instrumental and 
referential uses which are the most common uses of language. It 
is a metalinguistic activity, voluntary and rule-governed, with 
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an emphasis on the process as opposed to the goal (1979;221). One 
o£ the most important points that Kirshenblatt-Gimblett brings up 
that is not discussed in the ·psychological" literature in this 
£ield is that play is culture speci£ic. This notion was o£ 
course explored by the various anthropologists who did area 
studies on aspects o£ children's speech play. 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett and Sanches' comprehensive paper on 
the subJect o£ children's speech play (1976) surveyed the 
ethnographic literature and the various approaches and presented 
a study based on rhymes collected £rom £ive to £ourteen year 
olds. Their survey o£ children's speech play outlines these 
three maJor anthropological approaches: 
1) the traditional studies o£ nursery lore and rhymes (e.g. 
Opie and Opie: 1959) 
2) the sociolinguistic approach £ocusing on speech playas 
organizing behavior and de£ining social relations (e.g. Weir 
1962) 
3)"£rom the perspective o£ child language structure", which 
distinguishes three aspects speci£ic to children's verbal art--
the importance o£ phonological structure, a developing 
syntagmatic organization, and irregularities in rhyme/stanza 
structure (e.g. their own work) (1976) 
From their study, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett presented a developmental 
scheme o£ rules manipulated in speech play: phonological---
grammatical (syntax)--- semantic--- sociolinguistic (1976: 102). 
They posited that although a child is competent in/''Syntax by 
about age £our, playing",'with phonologi,PtlI rules remains prominent 
even a£~~ the child is semantically competent: not until about 
age 11 do children start playing with semantic relations. 
Cazden's work (1974) discussed children's speech play in 
terms o£ metalinguistic awareness. Metalinguistics £ocuses on 
meaning and intention. Concerning children's awareness, Cazden 
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presented the view that children's intention behind language play 
is, more 
expression 
often than adults', "for the very delight of self-
and mastery," (Cazden:33) She, as Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett did, discussed speech playas focusing on the "means· as 
opposed to the "end", Cazden noted that children over seven 
years increase their formalized game play. I believe that this 
is because at children at that age are simply more exposed to 
these formalized games, rather than due to any behavioral 
development. Her final remarks concerned the implications of 
these studies for education, as well as the stifling effect that 
adults may have on children's play. 
The core of the anthropological approach to the study of 
children's figurative language is not only conducting research in 
an ethnographic manner, but it is also studying figurative 
language in the context of speech play. Speech play is a 
cultural trait that should be examined in the process of learning 
the various facets of a particular culture. As Conklin noted: 
"Methods of modifying the normal patterns of speaking for 
purposes of entertainment or concealment are perhaps universal." 
(1964:295) Speech play, as a special variety of play, has been 
investigated using the concept of framing and conSidering the 
role of play in culture. As children's language has been 
recognized as a separate entity, so too has the idea of a 
separate 
accepted. 
children'S culture within the adult culture been 
Using Goffman's (1974) concept of "framing" as a way of 
analyzing behavior, Abrahams defined three "ideal states" framed 
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as play: performance, games, and festivities or celebrations 
(1978:120). These are all formalized versions of play, and it is 
important to be able to distinguish play, and in particular 
speech play, within a larger non-play frame. 
distinguish this well: 
In everyday interactions, we assume that both 
kidding can be carried on simultaneously-- or 
switch back and forth without calling the 
occasion into question. However, the moment 




at least we can 
nature of the 
we enter into a 
primary mode of 
This relates to the work of Bateson, "Theory of Play and 
Fantasy" (1972). Prominent in all three maJor works on this 
subJect (Abrahams, Bateson, Goffman) is the notion of the 
necessity of the question "Is this serious? (or non-play)" in 
order for a play-frame to hold; and then there is .the subsequent 
breaking of frames when this question becomes a reality. Speech 
play, like (regular) play, is subJect to the these same 
conditions, and I will show how this concept of framing is useful 
in analyzing children's speech play. 
Following Kirshenblatt-Gimblett and Sanches' (Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett and Sanches 1976, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1979) 
suggestion about the need for -natural setting" ethnographic 
research, I recorded the figurative language first graders use 
in a more "natural setting" situation than previous studies. 
This was done within the formal context of the school. This 
situation is certainly more "natural" than a testing situation, 
and it is also more conducive to the use of figurative language 
and speech play, especially as some of the work was even overtly 
framed as "play". I focused some of the work and conversation on 
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topics with questions that provoke more creative thinking or 
require the children to display their knowledge o£ double 
£unction terms, homonyms, and the like. 
I think I had an advantage with these children which most 
other psychologists and anthropologists have not had: although I 
was certainly the "adult" to these children, my role was somewhat 
more ambiguous than other adults in the school. The children 
recognized me both as younger than and not as authoritative as 
their teachers. This was aided by the £act that I was addressed 
by my £irst name whereas most o£ the other teachers were called 
by £ormal titles. Because o£ my position and duties, I was able 
to talk and work more in£ormally with the children and encourage 
longer interactions. 
I worked as a teacher's aide in a traditional, £irst-grade 
classroom that was part o£ the Eastwood School (grades K-2) in 
Oberlin, Ohio. I was involved in di££erent activities, but I 
usually worked with £our or £ive children, outside o£ the regular 
classroom. These activities included vocabulary building with 
£lashcards or educational board games, reading groups, arts and 
cra£ts proJects, and helping with math and money skills. I also 
£unctioned as playground monitor, clean-up director, and 
disciplinarian. I spent between 5 and 8 hours per week in the 
classroom £rom February to May, 1984. A£ter the £irst £ew 
sessions £amiliarizing mysel£ with the classroom and the 
children, I 
tape recorder 
started taping the work sessions using a portable 
hidden in my knapsack. (The teacher and I both 
agreed that a visible tape recorder would disrupt the work 
session too much.) I transcribed £rom these tapes only the 
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material that seemed relevant; 
session to session. 
this amount varied greatly from 
The class was composed of twenty-four pupils, six and seven 
years old. There were 13 boys and 11 girls in a racially mixed 
group (13 black, 11 white) that was drawn from both the 
surrounding rural area and the small, midwestern college-town of 
Oberlin, Ohio. Classroom grouping in the school was supposedly 
heterogeneous in terms of academic achievement and ability (after 
the parents make the choice to put their children in one of the 
traditional classrooms as opposed to the open classroom), but 
according to the teacher and testing results, this class overall 
had a low level of achievement. The children, both as 
individuals and as a group, were extraordinarily active and had 
behavioral problems; this was attested to by both their teacher 
and other teachers in the school. 
In the following chapters I will present the data I have 
collected of children's utterances, 
relation to the issues raised above. 
and I will analyze it in 
Chapters two contains a 
description 
utterances; 
of figurative language characteristics and 
chapter three contains the metaphorical utterances. 
Chapter four explains and applies the use of frame analysis to 




The children employed several different kinds of figurative 
language, only part of which was metaphorical in 
nature. Some of this figurative language was performed within an 
explicit play frame; most of the examples are from overtly 
structured work sessions. Often, however, a play frame (or 
within that, a speech play frame) was in existence in the work 
session. I will provide more specifics concerning the context of 
each utterance in terms of the linguistic and sociolinguistic 
environment; these factors (context and frame) are vital to 
understanding the utterance (as will be shown in chapter four). 
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FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE ATTRIBUTES 
Rhyme is often associated with children's play. One thinks 
of nursery rhymes, Jump-rope games, counting-out games; these 
are all based on rhyme. These types of speech play, are 
generally termed traditional children's lore and games. The 
husband and wife team Opie and Opie studied these in the 1950s: 
this work was among the earliest studies done concerning 
children's play. It is important to look beyond this type of 
work-- which was basically folklore and story-collecting-- into 
the broader questions of speech play use, speech play competence, 
and original speech play. But this traditional speech play 
cannot be ignored. I collected very little data that fell into 
this category of utterances; I was not working within the context 
of a situation and a frame that was suitable for the children to 
use traditional rhymes. Informally I did hear the children use 
these kinds of songs and games outside of the classroom and work 
sessions, but they did not often occur within the formal 
situation where I was collecting my data. 
Once, when I was working with a group of four boys, a 
traditional counting-out game was employed. We were starting to 
play an educational board game where everyone needed a different 
colored playing piece. The boys were arguing among themselves 
who would get what piece, and two of them could not agree on a 
certain color. I told the children that we would not begin to 
play until everyone had a piece, and in this way I attempted to 
let them solve their own problems. One boy started: 
F: Eeny~ meeny, ..• 
F and UN: m1ney, moe, catch a ••. 




F and UN: by the toe ••• 
F: I said piggy! 
UN: It's always tiger ••• 
ALL: Catch a [piggy/tiger] by the toe, i£ he hollers, let 
them go, eeny, meeny, miney, moe. (some say piggy, some 
tiger) 
D: Shut up, F. 
F: It's piggy. * 
This example makes it clear that although there is a common 
knowledge o£ the culture o£ children's traditional speech play, 
there are variations and disagreements about what is "correct". 
Rhyme was generally used by the children in a more subtle 
way than the obvious two-line or £ollow-word rhyme that is £ound 
in traditional lore. Some o£ these (and other types o£ 
utterances) examples that I present may seem subJectively chosen 
£rom my data as examples o£ rhyme; In many ways this was a 
subJective process. One consideration that I had in choosing 
what utterances I £elt were important and re£lected the various 
aspects o£ speech play is that I actually heard these utterances 
spoken. The per£ormance o£ the utterance not only added a clue 
to the intent o£ the utterance, but it also gave the per£ormance 
an entity in itsel£; even i£ the intent o£ an utterance was one 
idea, nonetheless the per£ormance o£ the utterance might give it 
another idea, which by its per£ormance becomes real. Much o£ 
this rhyme is expressed through emphasis. For instance, in 
trying to make up a sentence with the word "into· one girl began: 
*Note: Exerpts £rom the transcripts o£ my data will be included 
in the text indented and single-spaced. Single or double 
initials at the beginning o£ a line identi£y the speakers; 
important speakers to note are: DW is mysel£, SB is the teacher, 
UN is an unidenti£ied speaker, and ALL is all the children 
present. ·Und" is used to re£er to an undistinguishable 
utterance. 
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B: (und) went in the store 'cause he saw a ~ with a 
frui t stand. 
(When I commented to the girl that she did not use her vocabulary 
word, but that one can go "into· a store, she made up similar, 
related sentence, without the rhyme.) Both because of the way 
the girl emphasized these words (as indicated by the 
under lining), and her use of rhythm, I felt that this was a good 
example of an intentional rhyme. In technical terms these words 
do not rhyme "exactly·, but the rhyme that we are considering was 
a spoken, not a written, device, and it is the sounds that are 
important. 
Another series of rhymes was produced by two different boys 
as we were playing another board game. This game involved 
reading (or sounding out) a word, and then adding "the silent 
'e'" at the end of it and reading the new word. I then added the 
additional task that the children had to construct sentences with 
these new words. 
DW: Can you make up a sentence with "kite"? 
D: Kite flight. (the latter word might have been "fight") 
DW: Kite fight? What does that mean? 
D: O. k., deck ~. 
DW: That's not a sentence with "kite". 
D: Deck beck ••• kite ••• 
It should be noted that this boy was a good reader and had 
previously exhibited his skill in constructing sentences. After 
another child finally produced a correct sentence, another boy 
worked on a sentence with the word "rate"; it here became 
obvious that the children were having difficulty constructing 
sentences because the children were sometimes unfamiliar with the 
meanings of the new words. 
JY: Rate ••. wait. 
18 
(mumbling-- children talking about 
"rate" ) 
"right" instead of 
DW: Do you know what a "rate" is? 
fast you're doing something. 
(silence) It's like how 
D: Bigger, stronger, faster ••• (laugh) 
Once one child had started the idea of giving a two-word rhyme 
instead of a sentence, another one continued it. 
The other examples of rhyme fell within the category of 
name-calling. Throughout the playing of a board game (in which 
she was not doing too well), one girl cried, "You lucky duck," 
whenever someone else ~anded on a "good" space. The other 
example was at my unintentional instigation; the children were 
especially punchy while making puppets, so I said to one of them, 
"You silly!", to which one boy replied, ·Silly-billy." 
Rhythm is also used by the children as an intentional 
device. Words or sentences were recited with a very distinctive 
beat; this usually served to emphasize parts of the sentence by 
highlighting those words, but the rhythm also was used as an 
organizational device to set up a definite boundary within which 
the utterance occurred; this outlined the beginning and the end 
of the utterance. Often, as mentioned above, this rhythm was 
used in connection with rhyme to both emphasize the rhyme and 
state the end of an utterance; in the example above concerning 
the "~with a fruit stand," my added underlining points out 
not only the rhyme, but it also points out the emphasis that was 
present in the performance of the utterance. Rhythm is always 
present in a person's speech; that is, there is a natural beat 
that exists in words and a pattern is created when words are 
strung together. But in the children's speech this beat was very 
pronounced and generally regular and even. The children often 
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proJected this rhythm by either heavily accenting words with 
volume or by clapping or banging on the table. This latter 
proJection was especially common when the children performed 
traditional rhymes or games and music or television Jingles. 
There was not much mention of rhythm in the speech play 
literature. Like rhyme, it is taken for granted to be inherent 
in this type of play. However, rhyme has usually gotten a great 
deal more attention: it is a more obvious and intentionally used 
device, it is used by more sophisticated artists/poets, and it is 
recognized as a form of playing with phonetics. As phonetic 
play, rhyme is one of the earliest forms of speech play according 
to Kirshenblatt-Gimblett and Sanches. But rhythm, on the other 
hand, does not fit into their sequence of linguistic play 
[phonological-- grammatical-- semantic-- sociolinguistic] as it 
is not a linguistic (or sociolinguistic> device. However, as is 
it a mechanism by which the children play with speech, and it is 
a characteristic of several of the different forms of figurative 
language, it is relevant to this discussion. 
Repetition was used by the children in various ways. 
Intentionality was the most difficult to determine in the use of 
this device; repetition was used simply to get my (or another 
student's> attention when the child was not heard. For example. 
one child repeated three times: "Will you <ever> forget me when 
I get old?" This was the beginning of a knock-knock sequence, 
and the repetition of the line was not part of the playing 
sequence, but occurred merely because I was busy talking to two 
other children at the time and did not hear the speaker. Even 
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some of these utterances may be intentional uses of repetition 
for the purpose of emphasis. Keenan (1977) pointed out that 
repetition is not necessarily an imitative act as some 
researchers have described it. She suggested that it might be 
employed as a ·communication check". to make sure that an 
utterance was understood correctly (1977: 129). I used 
repetition in this manner repeatedly. to make sure both the 
children and I had understood the sentences they had made up. 
Keenan presented a list. which she then claimed was infinite. of 
the possible uses of repetition; this included answering. 
commenting. affirming. self - informing. and matching a claim 
<1977: 129-133). 
Several times. in response to questions that had one-word 
answers~ the children would repeat the word over and over again. 
turning it into a chant. For example. when we were playing "The 
Money Game" with fake coins in order to learn the names of the 
coins and their worth. I held up a nickel and asked the 
children: 
DW: What's this? 
UN: Five! 
DW: What's it also called? 
UN: A nickel-- nickel-- nickel-- nickel .•• 
This was the most common use of repetition. The children also 
expand on this play; instead of repeating single words within a 
line. they repeat words. sentences. or themes over the course of 
an interactive seqeuence. One popular theme. cookies and 
cookbooks. was even repeated over more than one work session. 
Both • cookies " and • cookbook " were vocabulary words. and during 
the session that they were on the flashcards which we worked 
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wi th, most o£ the sentences that the children constructed 
included at least one o£ the two words; in the next session 
with the same children, these words were still used repeatedly, 
even though they were not at that time part o£ the £lashcard 
words set. 
Another example o£ this thematic use o£ repetition was 
accomplished by one boy during the course o£ one session. We had 
read a story about a boy who was sick and sat looking out o£ the 
window; 
saw some. 
and I asked the children to complete the sentence, "He 
• Since in the story the boy had seen ·some boys 
and girls", one o£ the children completed the sentence: "He saw 
some good-looking girls." This sentence was repeated several 
times, as well as some variations on this theme. This case was 
obviously an intentional use o£ repetition, which will be £urther 
discussed in chapter £our with the use o£ £rame analysis. 
Homonymy was present in the children's utterances. More 
o£ten, rather than being used intentionally by the children, it 
was a source o£ con£usion in their comprehension o£ vocabulary 
words. The best example o£ this con£usion occurred when we were 
playing "the silent 'e' game", and the children had Just sounded 
out the word 'spin", added the "silent 'e' ", and sounded out the 
word "spine'. The children o£ten acted out sentences which they 
had constructed £rom these vocabulary words. Two o£ the boys in 
this group immediately got out o£ their seats and hid behind the 
tables and the bookshelves in the room. I did not understand 
what the children were doing. and I thought they were Just acting 
out; I also realized that this was a wqrd ("spine") that the 
children might not know: 
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OW: J, 0, come sit down. 00 you know what a ·spine" 
is-- do you know where your spine is? 
0: Spyin', I know what spyin' is ..• (although at the time I 
thought he was still saying ·spine") 
OW: It's the bone that goes way up your back. (pointing it 
out) 
0: This is spying, too ••.• 
At this point I realized that there was a homonymic con£usion and 
I explained that we were thinking o£ two di££erent words. 
It was o£ten not as clear whether there was con£usion as to 
the word being discussed, or whether the children were playing 
with the words. In one vocabulary work session the children were 
sounding out the word "into"J they kept repeating the word "to· 
(or possibly "two·): 
OW: It's more than Just "to" ••• 
UN: Three! 
C: Three! 
OW: C, sit down, we've got to hear B's word. • • 
BI In the. 
Q: Three! 
B: Not three,. <and then she made up her sentence with 
"to·) 
Here again we see the use o£ repetition with no clue as to its 
£unction except as pure play. 
There were two examples where the children obviously used 
homonyms as speech play. Again, the children encountered a word 
(Opine O ) that they were unsure o£ while playing the ·silent 'e' 
game", and in £act it was not clear to me how the word should be 
de£ined or used. One o£ the girls looked utterly con£used: 
OW: L, you know what a ·pine- is? 
0: I know what a pine is. • • <some other noises> •.• like 
an apple. <he laughsJ I didn't £ollow what he said> 
OW: It's a tree. • a pine tree. O.K., 0, it's your 
turn. 
UN: Pineapple. 
OW: Oh, a pineapple! 
Perhaps ·pine" as used in terms o£ a ·pine tree" and "pineapple" 
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are not really homonyms. but this was playing with homonymy. 
The other example of homonymic play took the unusual form of 
eliciting a non-linguistic response. If clarification is 
necessary. the word "shoot- has taken on a new meaning in the 
English language as an acceptable form of a vulagarity. One boy 
was having difficulties in his work on his puppet of Jack in the 
Beanstalk: 
D: Then I'll have to make a whole new Jack. Shoot! 
R: O.K., pyoo. (shooting him with his finger) 
The children play with semantic rules; that is, they play 
with the meanings of words. This is the basis of metaphor. which 
I will discuss later. According to Kirshenblatt-Gimblett and 
Sanches' developmental sequence of playing with linguistic rules, 
semantic play should be a fairly late development. although they 
did not suggest at what age metaphoric competence begins. One 
example of semantic play without a metaphoric connection (but 
rather Just for the sake of playing with the meaning and the 
sound of the word) was part of the initial "cookies" and 
"cookbook- sequence. One of the children was constructing a 
sentence with the word "cookbook": 
DW: How can we use the word 'cookbook"? 
L: Make cookies. . uh, make cookies. 
C: (then Joined by Q) Cookie-book. . . cookie-book. 
cookie-book. 
C: Chocolate-chip book. 
The children played with meaning often similarly to the way that 
people generally do even in their normal, conversational speech. 
Another other example of semantic play is in the form of an 
exaggeration. A boy was having trouble gluing the beard onto his 
puppet: 
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DW: Why'd you take the beard off? 
JY: It fell off! 
DW: Well, you should put some more glue on it. 
JY: I will ... I'll put a whole gallon! 
Exaggeration such as this demonstrates a fairly sophisticated 
level of semantic competence. 
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SPEECH PLAY UTTERANCES 
I have classified four types of utterances used by the 
children: sing-song, Jokes, nonsense and fantasy, and metaphor. 
These can be described with reference to the above attributes. 
Sing-song is a term that I use to describe half-chant/half-
song utterances. Sing-songs range from one sentence or line to 
five or six. They usually utilize rhyme and have a very 
definite, even rhythm, sometimes including an extra quick beat at 
the end of a line or stanza. It is these utterances which are 
most often accompanied by clapping, and sometimes they are also 
danced or acted out. There is both novel and traditional sing-
song, the latter is a cultural trait that is passed on, and it 
includes much of the traditional nursery lore and counting-out 
rhymes. An example of this was given earlier in this chapter in 
discussing rhyme (Reeny, meeny, . .R). There are also what I 
would term "new-traditional" sing-songs: "traditional" because 
they are a part of the corpus of general knowledge that is passed 
on (and they are not novel) and "new· because they are relatively 
recent additions usually taken from radio or television. The 
children are surprisingly knowledgeable concerning "pop· culture, 
and they often employ parts or all of songs or slogans from these 
sources. These utterances fit in well to this category of sing-
song in the manner that they were performed, and because they 
often rhyme and have a' distinctive beat. These utterances 
include the one-line ·Where's the beef?" (often inserted into an 
irrelevant context) and various renditions of the popular song 
"Beat It" (including its parody, "Eat It"). The children even 
carry this play a step further in playing on the sing-song, as 
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shown when two children were working on their puppets: 
JU: I need the glue. Where's the glue? (half singing) 
AJ: I have it! I ain't putting it. • see what I mean, 
she's smallest. • • Where's the glue? (in a funny voice) 
There were several examples of novel or original sing-song. 
There were all performed by the same girl (B). Two novel sing-
songs were performed consecutively; for some reason the children 
had started using the word "hippopotamous": 
B:Mr. Hippopotamous, sitting in the toilet, plop, 
plop. 
plop, 




the children were settling down, and they sounded 




B: Mr. Hippopotamous saw the sign. He stopped and said, 
·What a good ole sign." He turned around, he tried to do 
his business, he fart, fart, fart. • (breaks into 
laughter-- this was all acted out, danced, and clapped to) 
Another example comes from a different work session. B was 
supposedly acting out the word "go·, but the children were 
talking about and acting out different things, and she had been 
pretending to turn up the thermostat: 
DW: What're you doing? 
B: Cookies in the kitchen, ~~~(und) like this. Turned up 
the heater and you'll be dead! (laughs-- this was acted out 
half-sung) 
It was not clear to me if this utterance (as well as some others 
in the sample) were a novel sing-song or a "new-traditional" or 
even "traditional" one. This is due to both my different 
geographical upbringing and my lack of recent exposure to 
children's culture. 
Jokes have been studied as a separate genre throughout the 
anthropological and linguistic literature; here I treat it as 
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one of several categories of speech play and combine it with 
riddles and humor in general. There was not a great deal of Joke 
usage; I think this was due to a work environment that was not 
conducive to standard Joke usage. The children seem to be at a 
level of full understanding of Jokes; they seem to understand 
not only the form of Jokes but also their content, which is often 
incomplete in young children. 
One riddle was told to me in conversation while we were 
doing an arts and crafts proJect: 
Q: What's the biggest pencil in the world? 
DW: What? 
Q: Pennsylvania I (laugh) I got that on the cartoons ••• 
The influence of television is again apparent. 
Another, more interesting sequence, is a knock-knock Joke. 
Knock-knock Jokes generally have a standardized form: 
1: Knock-knock! 
2: Who's there? 
1 : 
2: who? 
1: (variable punch line) 
In order for a knock-knock Joke to work, both participants must 
be familiar with this standard form. Once the form is 
understood, the Joke ·works· if the content is also understood. 
Many people are familiar with the annoying habit of young 
children to repeat knock-knock Jokes repeatedly that do not seem 
to make sense and lack a funny punch line; in this case the 
children have learned the form of the Joke, but they do not 
understand that the content is also important-- they know that 
such Jokes are supposed to be funny and they really do find them 
funny in themselves. One of the children told me an unusual 
knock-knock Joke that plays on the form of the knock-knock Joke; 
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C had repeated ·Will you ever £orget me when I'm old?" a £ew 
times, but I had been busy with another student: 
c: Will you ever £orget me when I get old? 
UN: Watch this. 
Q: Knock-knock. • • (knowing the Joke and trying to get in on 
it) 
(C gets up and taps me on the shoulder) 
C: Knock-knock! 
DW: Who's there? 
C: See, you £orgot me already! (all laugh) 
There were several sequences that the children per£ormed 
that did not £all into any o£ these £ormally-described categories 
but were clearly other than ordinary discourse. I have combined 
these all together under the heading o£ £antasy and nonsense. 
Some researchers (i.e. Holquist 1969) would be aghast at this 
combined heading, since -nonsense' is a £ield o£ £ormal study; 
however, I am using the term as I think that Holquist employed 
it: 
Nonsense, like gibberish, is a violence practiced on 
semantics. But since it is systematic, the sense o£ 
nonsense can be learned. And that is the value o£ it: it 
calls attention to language. (1969: 161> 
I must admit that I was not always sure that the • sense " o£ the 
children's nonsense could be deciphered. "Fantasy· has also been 
studied, although not with anyone uni£yin.g idea-- Bateson (1972) 
used it in one sense in talking about play; Pitcher and 
Prelinger (1963) used it in another sense in analyzing children's 
stories. For lack o£ better terminology, I £eel Justi£ied in 
calling these utterances £antasy/nonsense. 
One example o£ ·pure· nonsense occurred when we had sounded 
out the word ·sign·, and I. asked the children what kinds o£ signs 
they could think oz. Since they had been previously talking 
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about cookbooks, C rep~ied; ·Cookbook sign." This did actua~~y 
make sense as the words were discussed within a sma~~ time sca~e. 
A more non sequitur response was given when I asked the chi~dren 
to comp~ete a sentence: 
DW: 
what? 
if the sentence Just said, 
0: -one. (right after ·some") 
"He saw some. • • . , 
OW: He saw someone. What e~se? Just if he were maybe 
~ooking out the window, what e~se cou~d he do. .? "He 
saw some .•• ?" 
0: He see the o~d ~ady getting run over by a big o~d rig and 
goes WHAPl 
These are both examp~es of this "non sequitur" nonsense: 
the sentence (or phrase) is nonsensica~, but it is somewhat 
comprehensib~e either because of the context or because the 
utterance is a comp~ete sentence. One of the ~ongest examp~es of 
nonsense was a sequence that invo~ved p~ays on the words 
"cookies·, "cookbook", and "ant"; to me this sti~~ reads ~ike an 
absurdist p~ay: 
(they have Just sounded out the word "good") 
OW: "Good". Can you te~~ us a story or a sentence. 
Q: Some cookies is good. 
. . 
OW: Some cookies are good, right? 
Q: Are. 
L: Some cookies are nasty. 
Q: Are. 
OW: Some cookies are nasty? 
C: 000000 (~aughs, then L JOins him) 
OW: What are nasty cookies? 








make cookies. (At this point in the 
about there being a homonymic 
between "ant· and "aunt") 
session I 
confusion 
OW: Your aunt, or a ~itt~e insect ant? (saying them 
different~y) 
Q: I got me two. 
UN: 0000000 
OW: You've got two ants? (pause, a~~ ~augh) Or have you got 
30 
two words? (as I see he's playing with his flashcards) 
Q: Yup. 
OW: What ants make cookies? 
Q: Oh I know, I know. 
L: Eat. . • 
OW: They eat cookies? I thought you said they make cookies. 
L: They make nasty cookies. They, •.• hee, hee, ••• 
OW: They make nasty cookies? 
<meanwhile, Q's been repeating ·cookbook") 
OW: Q, what did you say you knew? 
L: They make nasty ones. 
C: That's an uck-book. (laugh) 
This sequence came to an end at this point; this was apparent 
not only because we started sounding out a new word, but also I 
was only able to get the children to settle down because we had 
come to the "natural" end of the sequence. This was sometimes 
more difficult to Judge in nonsense sequences, but there always 
seemed to be a definite pause at the end of the sequence and then 
another subJect would pick up. 
There was only one example of original story-telling: that 
is, a story told that was not simply a recounting of actual 
events. This story falls under the category of fantasy/nonsense 
because of its content. It was a spontaneous utterance since I 
had not asked anyone to tell a story; two of the boys were 
repeating "hippopotamous· and "Mr. and Mrs. Hippopotamous·, and 
then a girl told this story: 
B: You know,. • my dad ••• (und) at the zoo they got a 
hippopotamous and it was a live one and they brought it 
into our yard and they took this thing. • • and they put it 
in the kitchen chair. • • and. • . 
OW: You had a hippopotamous in your kitchen? 
B: No, not in the kitchen, in the backyard. 
backyard. and the hippopotamous broke 
(laugh) 
OW: But it wasn't your backyard, was it? 
B: No. 
OW: It was the zoo! 
B: That was funny! 
in the zoo 
the chair! 
Although I did want to encourage the child's creativity, I was 
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interested to know to what extent she would uphold the fantasy 






extent she was aware that what was saying was 
It is also interesting that at the end the girl 
the fact that this was supposed to be a "funny· 
was an appropriate closing of the story-telling 
This chapter has described the maJor attributes that 
distinguish children's figurative language: rhyme, rhythm, 
repetition, homonymic play, and semantic play. The utterance 
groups of sing-songs. Jokes. and nonsense and fantasy were then 
outlined, summarizing the children's explorations into the use of 
figurative language in speech play with the exception of 





When someone uses a metaphor ~n conversat~on, they do not 
usually say, "Here's a metaphor!". It ~s often d~ff~cult to 
d~st~ngu~sh a metaphor~cal utterance, espec~ally when one 
real~zes that most metaphors are not uttered ~n the form·X ~s 
yo, as we learned ~n grade school. There have been several tests 
and standards set up to determ~ne metaphor~c~ty of an utterance. 
Many of these were or~g~anally created for psychotherapy test~ng. 
Often a panel of three Judges work together, vot~ng on the~r own 
wh~ch ones they th~nk are metaphor~cal and then consulting on 
d~sagreements. I s~mply read carefully over the transcr~pts of 
the sess~ons that I had taped of the ch~ldren to determ~ne 
metaphor~c~ty. 
F~rst, I w~ll ~ntroduce. the three types of metaphor, us~ng 
standard, adult language term~nology. In each case I w~ll raise 
some of the ~ssues ~nvolved ~n us~ng these terms for d~scuss~ng 
ch~ldren's f~gurat~ve language, and then I w~ll expla~n the 
broader ~ssues and ~mpl~cat~ons ~n us~ng these terms. Second, I 
w~ll present mater~al from work sess~ons w~th the ch~ldren that I 
feel exh~b~ts metaphor~c capab~l~t~es. 
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STANDARD METAPHOR TYPES 
Conventional metaphor is the formal metaphor that is most 
commonly thought of as "metaphor". These are the metaphors which 
generally are in the form "X is yR. Conventional metaphors are 
part of the lexicon as a complete utterance; they can generally 
be understood by anyone who is sociolinguistically competent in 
the language. Even if the exact metaphor has not been heard 





such that a person would know which 
for the comparison. Because of 
set of 
this, 
conventional metaphors or their comparison parts are often 
clicht?s. Some examples are: "George is a lion," "The moon is a 
block of swiss cheese," and "She's as bright as the day." 
There are several problems involved in the use of 
conventional metaphor as a category of children's metaphoric 
utterances. First, conventional metaphor use among the children 
was very rare. This in itself need not invalidate the category, 
although it displays its limited application. Second, if a child 
has never heard a conventional metaphor before, the metaphor 
lacks the familiarity that defines a conventional metaphor. Thus 
the conventional metaphor could be a novel utterance (and a novel 
metaphor) to a child listener. According to the definition of 
metaphor. there is no provision for this issue of cultural 
competence. An utterance is either a conventional, frozen, or 
novel metaphor, or it is not a metaphor at all. The problem with 
taking cultural competence into consideration is that it would be 
impossible to determine on an individual basis for every 
utterance; unless this were approached "scientifically" with 
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psychological-style testing methods which I think would also 
prove insufficient in other ways. Whether or not a child is 
competent in adult metaphor is irrelevant to a discussion of the 
metaphoric and figurative language capabilities of children. 
Frozen metaphor is an utterance that at one point was 
metaphorical in nature (and still has some sense of 
metaphoricity), but it has become such a part of the standard 
lexicon that the comparison itself is no longer considered. Many 
researchers do not even consider these utterances metaphorical; 
Pollio and Pollio (1974) argued that it is irrelevant to 
<children's) metaphor studies. Some examples of frozen metaphor 
are: ·She's a doll,· "He's an ass,· as well as slang and 
synaesthetic comparisons such as ·We got burned in that test,· 
and "She's sweet." 
Frozen metaphors are relevant to child language studies 
because they require semantic understanding across domains; it 
is this type of understanding that is necessary for metaphor 
comprehension. The other, perhaps even more important reason why 
this type of utterances must be examined among children, is that 
the children themselves highlight frozen metaphors in their 
speech. Either by emphasizing the semantic incongruity or by 
simply calling attention to an otherwise innocuous statement, the 
children are labeling the use of frozen metaphor as "speech 
play". 
There are also novel or (original) metaphors. These are 
metaphors which are not a part of the standard lexicon, not even 
among the corpus of adult metaphors. Often metaphors are only 
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novel in part; that is, the performer may use a common 
comparison or metaphor in a new way. The difficulty that arises 
in analyzing novel metaphor, and specifically children's novel 
metaphor. is the determination of metaphoricity. Intention is 
generally considered a requirement for metaphor, but it is not 
always obvious when a child utters a metaphorical statement 
whether or not the metaphor was intentional or not. This is 
especially difficult to determine among young children; when a 
metaphorical name is given to an obJect there is the possibility 
that the metaphor is actually the only name that is known for the 
obJect. But if the child has created that metaphorical name, is 
that not a metaphorical act? I consider this true, and the issue 




I have tried to differentiate between metaphor usage (or 
production) and metaphor comprehension. As exp~ained in the 
first chapter, this had been a prob~em with some of the ear~y 
studies, that assumptions were drawn concerning comprehension 
from usage data. It was very difficu~t to determine 
comprehension because of the nature of my work. In a non-
testing, natura~ discourse situation, a ~ow ~eve~ of metaphor 
usage makes metaphor comprehension ~eve~s difficu~t to determine 
since there is then no data to base the conc~usions on. If I 
had uti~ized adu~t. standard metaphorica~ categories, I wou~d 
have been unab~e to discuss metaphor comprehension. But as I 
viewed the chi~dren's productions in a broader manner, I was ab~e 
to draw some conc~usions with regard to comprehension. 
There was one c~ear instance in my work where I was ab~e to 
probe the issue of metaphor comprehension. At the beginning of 
one group's new reading book, there was a poem that the teacher 
was supposed to read a~oud to introduce the chi~dren to the new 
book; the vocabu~ary of the poem was Just above their current 
reading ~eve~, but it was supposed to be within their 
comprehension ~eve~. Here is the poem which I read: 
Mi~e-~ong skyscrapers are my trees, 
The subways' whoosh my summer breeze; 
The hydrant is my swimming poo~. 
Where a~~ my friends keep rea~ coo~. 
The city is the p~ace to be, 
The city is the p~ace for me. 
This is a metaphor packed poem. Whi~e I read it to the chi~dren, 
the two boys and one gir~ began acting out the poem: they moved 
their arms about for ·whoosh"; they imitated swimming when I 
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read ·swimming pool". These movements were done simultaneously 
with or immediately after I read the phrases, so the children's 
movements were often quick and Jerky or indecisive as they were 
not certain of what would come next. When I read the fourth 
line, one of the boys and the girl hugged their arms in an 
imitation of "keeping cool", and the other boy held his thumb up 
with a clenched fist, signifying the slang term "cool": 
0: Dh, cool. (making the gesture. and interrupting me) 
OW: The city is the place to be, the city 
0: That's my friends, cool. • • 
OW: is the place for, ••• what's that say? 
ALL: Me. • • me. • • (which was the last word as I had asked) 
OW: What'd you say about ·cool"? 
0: Yeah ••. (with ·cool" gesture) 
OW: You're cool, well .•• what else is cool? When you go 
swimming it keeps you cool so you're not too hot. 
0: No, I'm (und) the real cool way. Cool (und-- possibly 
"it up·) (with gesture) 
(all laugh) 
The children demonstrated their understanding of these 
metaphors by their reactions. o carried the process one step 
further by playing with these words, and by showing his knowledge 
of the double-meaning and the metaphorical nature of the term 
·cool". Slang terms are often metaphorical statements; how much 
they have retained their metaphoricity may be a matter of 
argument. However, the fact that 0 called attention to the 
meaning of the word signifies its importance in speech play. The 
children are not interested in explaining their understanding 
however. Possibly, as many studies concerning developmental 
processes suggest, this is a later development, and at this point 
the children were not able to explain or rationalize their 
responses (Winner, Rosensteil, and Gardner 1976: 296). 
I wanted to check if the children understood not Just the 
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metaphor using the word ·skyscraper", but also the word 
"skyscraper" itsel£; the word itsel£ is metaphorical. but more 
inmportantly I realized that children growing up in Oberlin, who 
might not have been exposed to many other sources, may not know 
what a skyscraper is: 
OW: Mile-long skyscrapers. have you ever seen a 
skyscraper? 
0: Everybody's seen one o£ the them. 
OW: Yes? 
(mumbles) 
OW: Is there a skyscraper in Oberlin? 
0: No-o-o (laughing) 
OW: So i£ you've never been outside oz. .have you ever 
seen. • you know what a skyscraper is? (to R who looked 
lost) 
R: (shakes head "no·) 
0: (und) 
OW: It's a really tall building. And it looks like it 
almost touches the sky, so they call it a • skyscraper " 
(which 0 says with me). Because what's a ·scraper"--
something that like scrapes against it (showing with hands 
like claws). So it looks like it scrapes against the sky 
(no reaction). But is it really a mile long? (mumbling) 
No •.• "mile-long" is Just because it's really big. 
The children were relatively silent during this long-winded 
explanation-- I £elt uncom£ortable as the children seemed rather 
bored and because I £ound it very hard to explain the word and 
its metaphorical nature. It was also di££icult to con£ront the 
children's lack o£ comprehension without causing undue 
embarassment on their part. 
Another example o£ a slang term carrying metaphorical 
meaning was demonstrated in a di££erent way. This example, 
described in chapter two, involved one boy (R) responding to the 
swear o£ another child (0: "Shoot!). R played with the obvious 
double-meaning o£ the word, a sign o£ a metaphor. In this way, R 
turned D's statement into a metaphor, which he then carried out 
literally in play. 
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Double-meaning does not necessarily imply metaphor. Double-
meaning also should not be confused with Asch and Herlove's term 
"double function"-- the latter is a very specific term meaning 
only words which refer to both physical and psychological 
aspects. Double-meaning is often present in a metaphor, as the 
double meaning of a word often refers to different aspects of 
that same word; it is these different aspects that a metaphor, 
in its cross-semantic sense, refers to. The ability to apply 
different meanings to the same word seems to be a requisite for 
metaphor use and comprehension. Knowledge of double-meaning 
reflects metaphor comprehension, even if there is not a causal 
relationship. One must be careful not to confuse homonyms when 
deciphering double-meanings, as two words may be spelled exactly 
the same and be either homonyms (i.e. two different words) or be 
actually the same word with two different meanings: 
A bank where you put money and the bank of a river are two 
different. homonymic words. 
The verb guard. as in someone standing guard over something 
is the same word as the noun guard. 
The sleeve of a coat and the sleeve (i.e. Jacket) of a book 
are two different and metaphorical ways of using the same 
word. 
These homonymic connections, as described in chapter two, are the 
basis for many puns and are important sources for speech play. 
The children seem to be aware of the possibility of double-
meaning in words, and they do not call attention to the double-
meaning unless they are specifically using it for speech play. 
In one of my less successful attempts to test the children's 
sentence building abilities, I asked the children to construct 
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sentences using two vocabulary words at a time. One of the girls 
showed her knowledge of double-meaning terms as we were working 
with the words "Ben" and ·sign": 
B: Ben signs the application. 
DW: That's good; can you think of another one with ·sign"? 
B: Ben saw the sign. 
I want to return to the idea of the children "highlighting" 
a metaphorical situation, bringing out the metaphoricity in an 
utterance which renders it important (whereas most adults would 
ignore these utterances as frozen metaphors). One example took 
place in the classroom, where the teacher and I were trying to 
get the Children ready to leave school; this includes cleaning 
up the room and putting the chairs on the tables. After these 
tasks had been done, F knocked over a chair and left it on the 
ground: 
SB: Could you please fix the chair, F? 
F: It ain't broken! 
SB: Could you please put the chair back up where it 
belongs?! 
Many people who have worked with children are familiar with these 
sometimes exasperating exchanges where one has to select one's 
words carefully in order to use only literal terms. Another 
example of a child recognizing the metaphorical possibilities of 
an everyday. frozen utterance, occurred when the children were 
settling down to work at a table in the art room. They argued 
about who should sit where; I. like the teacher in the above 
example. used a common, frozen metaphor: 
S: No, you sit there! 
DW: No. I'm sitting at the head. (i.e. of the table) 
F: You have to sit over there! 
S: No, I don't want to! 
F: You're at the feet! (to the boy sitting opposite me) 
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There was one c~ear examp~e of a chi~d using a conventiona~ 
metaphor. Whi~e the chi~dren were making puppets, the 
conversation drifted to ta~king about being sma~~-- who was the 
sma~~est in the c~ass, whose sib~ings were bigger or sma~~er 
than they. One of the boys who hadn't been invo~ved in the 
conversation previous~y Joined in: 
JA: When my mom was a gir~ she said she was as skinny as 
a rai~. 
DW: Real~y? (~aughing a litt~e; everyone e~se was quiet) 
JA: Yeah. 
UN: As a what? 
JA: A rai~. 
UN: (different than above) What's a rai~? 
JA: Rail track. Railroad track. . • for a train. 
UN: (above) Yeah. 
AJ: I need some g~ue. . • 
The chi~dren were basical~y si~ent throughout this exchange 
(which is unusual>. and in the ~ast ~ine it is apparent that the 
chi~dren went right back to work; the frame of that particu~ar 
discussion was over. It is difficu~t to determine if the chi~dren 
understood the metaphor in the end; it is obvious that at ~east 
one and probably two chi~dren did not understand the metaphor 
initia~~y (un~ess the first UN simp~y did not hear JA, a~though 
he spoke loud~y and c~ear~y). Although the chi~dren were quiet, 
from my observation and from the response of the second UN 
speaker, I wou~d say that the chi~dren cou~d understand the 
utterance once they were to~d the meaning (in context) of ·rai~·. 
I can positively state that at ~east some of the chi~dren were 
not fami~iar with the metaphor; here ~ies the basis of my 
argument that adult conventiona~ metaphor must often be examined 
as nove~ metaphor to the chi~d ~istener (which will be further 
discussed in chapter five). 
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There was another utterance that was rather difficult to 
analyze. This is because I thought that the words were vaguely 
familiar and they were possibly a Jumbled-up version of a 
conventional metaphor, but I have not been able to find 
verification for this fact; the utterance could be novel. In 
any case, I have been unable to discern its meaning. One of the 
girls had gone back to the art supply room to get some more 
materials, and she brought back some white cotton balls, stuck 
together, that one of the boys had wanted to use but had left 
behind. As the girl put the cotton on the table, she said: 
L: He left this sitting in the window like a bald chicken. 
It is interesting to note that this, like the above conventional 
example, is in the standard metaphor and simile form of ·X is 
like yR. 
There was one clear novel metaphor uttered. I was working 
in the art supply room, finishing the clean-up with one of the 
boys. There was a very strange noise coming from the corner of 
the room, a sort of low, growling sound: 
DW: Hear that? 
c: What was it? 
DW: It's the sink. It is the sink making that noise. 
C: It's a good trumpet sink ••• a trumpet sink. 
This was not only an appropriate metaphor, in that it fit what 
was being described and was also from a different semantic 
category, but it was also in the standard form of ·X is Y·, which 
is not common among children's metaphors. This was the most 
sophisticated utterance of my data; I might be biased in putting 
forth this supposition because I was impressed by the utterance, 
which came unsolicited after many attempts to encourage such 
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language. 
One of the problems, which I mentioned briefly in the early 
discussion of novel metaphor, in determining the metaphoricity of 
novel utterances, is that it is not often clear what the 
intention of the statement was. If the intention was not 
metaphorical, but was simply a result of a limited vocabulary and 
limited knowledge, it is questionable whether or not the 
utterance should be considered metaphor. At one session where a 
group of children were working on puppet-making, we started 
talking about swimming and swimming lessons, as the children were 
currently all taking swimming lessons through the school. 
Apparently the children were familiar with the programs that 
teach very young children how to swim or at least how to be 
comfortable in the water: 
L: You seen them babies swimming in the water. • • 
C: They're water babies-- they were born in water. 
OW: They weren't born there. • • 
B: Their mommas learned them how to swim. 
Here the question of intention is relevant in terms of whether or 
not C really thought the children were "born in water." This 
could only be answered with a direct question to C, which I did 
not consider at the time. The use of alternate names raises the 
question of whether the children realize that they are using 
alternate names. These names may be metaphorical; even if they 
are not, the use of alternative names is still relevant to the 
metaphor acquistion. It has been suggested that: 
Although metaphoric competence includes far more than the 
ability to call one obJect by the name of another, there is 
good precedent for considering renaming as central to the 
operation in metaphor. (Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer, and 
Wolf 1978: 1S) 
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In one work session, I was working with two, qUiet girls, 
who were learning the names of coins. In this case, one of the 
girls created her own name for a coin, which then became an 
alternative term. She saw the Kennedy half-dollar for the first 
time, and she cried: 
L: 000, his hair's flying. 
Later in the same session, I asked the girls: 
DW: Do you have any 
uncertain) Yep, you know 
L: It's the man flying 
"with his flying hair") 
half-dollars? 
it. 
with his hair 
(pause-- they look 
in the air. (i. e. 
We were working on exactly the issue in question-- knowing the 
"real" name of the obJect (and learning both the value name and 
the "real" name). L was familiar name of the coin-- she knew it 
was a half-dollar. Perhaps it seems she was Just adding a 
description to the name, but this is in fact what a metaphor is; 
it is a description of an obJect using characteristics. (or by 
comparison with another obJect) that does not usually apply 
directly to that obJect (i.e. they are not in the same semantic 
category). Hence L has created a metaphor which in standard form 
would be: "Kennedy is the man whose hair is flying." 
The use of the words "kill" and ·sick" in the English 
language carry slang, metaphorical meanings as well as their 
standard meanings referring to death and murder and health. 
These particular usages are good examples of frozen metaphors. 
Again, note that the use of these words among the children is 
important especially because the children call attention to these 
words and their usage in this manner, while they realize that 
they are not using the words literally. We were reading a story 
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about a boy who could not go outside because he was sick, and the 
children were arguing (through their actions) regarding who 
should read: 
OW: Thank you, J. O.k., 0, could you read the second half 
of this? 
J: But you can't go outside because. 
OW: J, O's going to read. 
0: But you can't go outside because 
o & J: you are •• 
OW: Go ahead, O. 
J: Sick. 
OW: You are sick. (repeating the complete sentence to make 
sure that they understood it) 
0: You are SICK! (with emphasis= ·you're disgusting") 
(laughs) 
This is an example of the metaphorical slang use of "sick" to 
mean disgusting. Another time ·sick" was used in a different 
way, this time not to give "sick" itself a different meaning, but 
rather to apply it to an obJect to which it does not usually 
apply (i.e. an inanimate obJect). L, who gets discouraged 
easily, was having trouble gluing something to her puppet: 
L: It don't work! 
OW: Wasn't it Just working a minute ago? 
L: It don't now •• 
Q: Maybe it's sick! 
The word "kill" is often used in a non-literal sense as an 
exaggeration when someone is angry with someone else or unhappy 
with a situation. Other words referring to being dead are also 
used in the same way; these have become slang terms without any 
real threatening connotations of actual death (unless a play 
frame ,is not present or is broken). It might be argued that 
children of this age, who might not understand death, do not 
understand the slang and metaphorical nature of the use of these 
words in this manner, but I think that the children are fully 
aware of the difference between this usage and reality. Even if 
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the children do not "understand" death, they are cognizant of a 
Joking situation; if they were not. the frame would break and 
the Joke or slang term would not work, as it clearly does: 
DW: No, what would you say, come on, what would you say if 
you were sick and you wanted to go out, and your mother 
said, "No, you can't go out, you're sick," what would you 
say? 
D, I'd kill my mom. 
(all laugh) 
DW, Would you really kill her? 
D: Yeah. . (not seriously) 
(D was fooling around and being silly and then stopped) 
A, D's dead! 
S: I killed him! 
DW, Come on, D. . 
I have here presented many examples of the metaphorical 
utterances of the children. These, together with the examples in 
chapter two of non-metaphorical figurative language use, provide 





I have introduced the concept of framing, 
tool, in reference to the different aspects 
as an analytical 
of figurative 
language and speech play mentioned so far. Here I will further 
integrate that discussion and wi~l show how the notion of framing 
is central to the study of speech play. I will apply this 
analytical method to a speech play act from my data. I am 
working primarily from the definitions of framing and keying as 
put forth by Bateson (1972) and Goffman (1974). 
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FRAME ANALYSIS: SUMMARY 
As Bateson pointed out, the notions of "frame" and 'context" 
are psychological concepts, and we must use analogy to discuss 
these concepts. A frame "is (or delimits) a class or set of 
messages (or meaningful actions)." (Bateson 1972:186) The word 
"frame" is used because it presents us with the useful analogy to 
a picture frame. The frame represents an organizational boundary 
enclosing this message set. Using the image of a frame, we can 
understand how behavior is organized within a delimited space 
defining a context, which itself is also contained within a 
larger frame. It is useful to use the term "frame" as distinct 
from "set" because what is contained within the frame is more 
than a collection of obJects; there is a relationship between 
those obJects (or behavior or linguistic activity) which defines 
the frame. A set is also defined by its members, but in the case 
of framing, the boundary (i. e. the frame itself) between the 
members of the set and the outside world is important. Goffman 
pointed out that there is a very complex relationship between the 
frame and its environment which creates a paradox in discussing 
the "frame rim" (Goffman 1974:248-9). 
Goffman provided a definition of frame with regard to its 
use: -Frame, however. organizes more than meaning; it also 
organizes involvement." (Goffman 1974: 345) Bateson presented 
two paradoxical descriptions of frame and framing concepts which 
actually provide clearer insight into these issues: 
We assume that the psychological frame has some degree of 
real existence. In many instances, the frame is consciously 
recognized and even represented in vocabulary ("play,' 
"movie," "interview,· "Job," "language,· etc.). [Yet, 1 
the psychological concept which we are trying to define is 
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neither physical nor logical ••• (Bateson 1972:186-7) 
Goffman's concern that meaning and involvement are the principle 
aspects of the frame works with Bateson's descriptions. These 
aspects are real; however, they are not concrete entities and 
their existence is probably only essential in frame recognition. 
This recognition is very important. particularly from the aspect 
of speech play. In speech play the frame is often explicit. I 
will later point out where the children explicitly recognized the 
existent frame, and the importance of this in regard to frame 
continuance or breakage. 
One of the goals of frame analysis is to answer the 
question: ·What is it that's going on here?" The answer to this 
question is "an event or deed described within some primary 
framework." (Goffman 1974:5) Goffman defined this special type 
of framework, a primary framework, as 
one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be 
meaningless aspect of the scene into something that 
meaningful. (Goffman 1974:21) 
a 
is 
Keying helps determine what the participants think is going on. 
Goffman defined a key as: 
a set of conventions by which a given activity, one already 
meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is 
transformed into something patterned on this activity but 
seen by participants to be something quite else. (1974: 43-
44) 
A keying is the performance of a keyed action: 
Actions framed entirely in terms of a primary framework are 
said to be real or actual. to be really or actually or 
literally occurring. A keying of these actions performed. 
say, onstage provides us with something that is not literal 
or real or actually occurring. Nonetheless. we would say 
that the staging of these actions was really or actually 
occurring. (1974: 47) 
Goffman later expanded his definition to include rekeyings, which 
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are keyings that work on the keying of a primary framework. This 
process of transformations can be continued, and these 
transformations can be viewed as various "layers or laminations 
to the activity.· (1974: 82) 
Frames are both defined and manipulated by their frame 
limits. As Goffman explained: 
In all cases, however, understood limits wil be established, 
a definition concerning what is insufficient involvement and 
what is too much. (1974: 345) 
When these frame limits are testedr' the frames are sUbJect to 
breakage. Breakage occurs when an event takes place that cannot 
be ignored but which cannot be contained within the frame 
(Goffman 1974: 347). Goffman called one manifestation of frame 
breakage "flooding"; a good example of flooding is when, in an 
uncomfortable situation, a person "cracks up· or "breaks up· with 
laughter. This flooding is a realization of the misframing of 
events. Another possible reaction to a frame break is when "the 
individual's behavior can retain role organization but in a 
shifted key." (1974: 359) In this case, the frame has been 
reframed. 
Frames in general are variable, non-static structures. 
Frame breakage requires a drastic reorganization of the 
situation. There are two basic kinds of transformations that may 
occur-- keyings and fabrications. (Goffman 1974:247) Keying 
provides an underlying theme concerning what holds the frame 
together. Fabrication is, in a sense, a fraudulent keying; it 
is a transformation whereby there is intentional manipulation by 
at least one of the participants which give to another a false 
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answer to the question ·What is it that's going on here?" 
Frame analysis, and the organization it provides, can be 
applied to speech play. Speech play is not only an isolated 
linguistic activity, it is a form of play. The convergence of 
frame analysis and play occurred in Bateson's work. In studying 
play in animals, he provided this memorable analogy, which 
illuminates the concept of the play frame: "The playful nip 
denotes the bite, but it doesn't denote what the bite denotes." 
In this manner, Bateson answered Goffman's question 'What is it 
that's going on here?" with "This is play.' A general play frame 
can be described in this way: 
• these actions in which we now engage do not denote 
what would be denoted by those actions which these actions 
denote. (Bateson 1972:180) 
In the transition from play to speech play, this description 
can simply be applied using linguistic phenomena. This is not to 
suggest that speech play is purely linguistic; it is a 
sociolinguistic act. However, in speech play words are used as 
the primary means of manipulation to accomplish the playful act. 
A speech play act is usually part of a conversation; it does not 
take place in isolation. There appears to be one participant who 
is dominant or controlling the speech play frame; any 
participant can add to the frame, or even break it, but there is 
generally one dominant person who essentially creates and upholds 
the frame. 
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FRAME ANALYSIS: APPLICATION 
I have chosen an excerpt from a work session with the 
children that provides a good example both of speech play and of 
framing. This will demonstrate why frame analysis is an 
extremely useful method of eXamining (children's) speech play. I 
will cite short passages of the conversation in the text; line 
numbers refer to the appendix which contains a complete 
transcription of this excerpt. 
This conversation took place during a reading group session. 
This in itself provides a context for the conversation: it was 
school, it was in a small group outside of the regular classroom, 
and it was a reading group. As the teacher of the group, I 
established the frame within which we would work. Thus there 
were already several layers of framing in existence. 
Within this frame, o created a speech play frame revolving 
around the line "good-looking girls". The children knew that 
this line is related to sex and is a subset of "dirty· sUbJects 
which are taboo to talk about both in school and in front of 
adults; hence the use of such words gives the children a certain 
power, both in creating humor and in breaking taboos. The story 
that the children read contained the sentence, "He [Teddy] saw 
some boys and girls." 
17 OW: What did it say that he saw? What did Teddy see? 
18 J & R: Boys and girls. 
19 0: (und-- cackling) 
20 OW: What else do you think, if the sentence Just said, •.• 
21 "He saw some .•• ," ••• what? 
The children provided a few different answers to this question, 
mostly employing nouns that refer to people. 
42 OW: (simultaneously with J) Is there something else he 
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Here, 
43 could have seen? Just think .•• shhhhh. 
44 J: People. 
45 OW: He saw some people. 01 
46 0: He saw some good-looking girls. (laughs as do the 
others) 
o began his speech play. When I changed the sentence and 
asked the children to complete "He heard some •••• •• o continued 
the speech play [line 50l. The new sentence did not make sense 
logically. but both given the social meaning that motivated it 
(i. e. an attitude that ·good-looking· is a primary trait of 
females that is all-pervasive) and given the assertion of power 
by using this taboo language. it fit well into the speech play 
frame that 0 had set up. o repeated the sentence several times 
[lines 62. 65. 67]; he still laughed as did the others. As long 
as the children all thought the line was funny. they were 
operating under this same speech play frame. The laughing was a 
confirmation that they all still agreed that "this is play.· 
Finally. (after line 85), I tried to convince the children 
that the Joke. and therefore the frame. was over. Then 0 started 
inserting his line wherever he could [lines 107. 114. 126]. As 
the conversation continued. his interest in the play seemed to 
drop. but then he would return to it. The other two children 
also began to lose interest. but as long as they did not produce 
a negative reaction, the frame of play and speech play remained. 
The conversation had turned to another subJect; we began talking 
about being sick. which extended into talking about sChool. At 
this point 0 brought the line into the context of the 
conversation again: 
142 OW: ••• but 
143 D: Yeah. 
144 you miss 
you don't get to play if you're really sick. 
but (I insert a 'shhh' since he's screaming) 
school and I hate school. 
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145 DW; Why--I think it's fun--you get to play some games ..• 
146 D; And anyways you can meet them good-looking girls. 
At line 150 the frame broke. D, referring to the "good-
looking girls·, said, "But not you, J." This was no longer play. 
This is similar to Labov's (1972) finding concerning sounding 
rules and exchanges; when the "insults· get too close to home, 
they are no longer considered play, and the frame breaks. It is 
not clear in the transcription, but at this point there was an 
almost audible gulp, a silence. J was taken aback, and R 
mumbled something undecipherable which did not seem to support 
D's comment. There was definite tension in the air; it was 
strange how obvious the shift in conversation that had occurred 
was felt. I offered a condemnation for J's sake [line 153], as 
in my position I had to both demand fair and proper behavior from 
the children and uphold the general work frame under which we 
were working; if this were not done there could have been a 
total break (of the work frame), feelings would be terribly hurt, 
and the situation would disintegrate into a hostile situation. 
I had an important position within this group. I was only 
partially involved in the framing that D set up, in part because 
of my ambiguous position of "authority" (and therefore 
responsibility for preventing too much "bad" talk), and in part 
because I was trying to steer the conversation away from the 
topic. Here we can see a power-play occuring. Within the work 
frame that I had set up, D had established a play frame which he 
was trying to uphold. Not only was there an expression of power 
in his establishing the play frame, but D had to exert power to 
maintain his play frame. This is a good example of how frames 
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within £rames work. The p1ay £rame was maintained £or a 10ng 
whi1e, unti1 D pushed the 1imits o£ the £rame too £ar, and the 
£rame broke. The outer work £rame that I had estab1ished sti11 
existed, and that £rame was maintained. On the 1ast 1ine o£ the 
transcript [153] I mention that the chi1dren were settling back 
into work; the children returned to the work they were doing, 
reading and constructing sentences, 
gir1s· was never mentioned again. 
and the line "good-10oking 
When the chi1dren were 
distracted £rom their work. they did not usually sett1e down as 
easi1y as they did in this instance; this was probab1y a1so a 
reaction to the tension o£ the situation and the £rame break. 
It is interesting to go £urther into the "whys' o£ speech 
play among children. 
with language "£or 
It has o£ten been said that chi1dren 
the sake o£ it." (Cazden: 1974) This 
play 
is 
probably somewhat true £or simp1er, or £or more pure1y phonetic, 
speech p1ay. 
is going on. 
In the above example, it is obvious that much more 
This is an extension £rom the £irst reason that I 
presented: these words are p1ayed with and uttered as they are 
concerning subJects that the chi1dren are not ·supposed" to ta1k 
about. Since these words are not ·supposed" to be said, the 
chi1dren are accomp1ishing an act (more than Just p1ay) in saying 
these things. This act is an expression o£ power. As there is 
intention in a speech act, so there is intention in a speech play 
act. There is sti11 a p1ay£ul side to the utterance, but there 
is always a reason why certain words or ideas are p1ayed with and 
not others. Many speech play acts are probab1y re1ated to this 
exertion o£ some kind o£ power or authority in a situation where 
a person does not (in a "rea1", non-play situation) have that 
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kind of authority: here, the chiLdren as pupiLs in schooL do not 
have authority. Therefore, the chiLdren create a pLay frame 
wherein they do have controL and can express that authority. 
However, D pushed that power to the Limit of the pLay frame, and 
he broke the frame. 
It must be noted that this kind of speech pLay act is 
different from the one-Line metaphors and other utterances that 
were discussed in earLier chapters. 
for those types of utterances; 
Frame anaLysis is not usefuL 
they are a different use of 
figurative Language as opposed to speech pLay per se. Speech 
pLay can invoLve figurative Language, and figurative Language is 
a kind of speech pLay, but not aLL speech pLay invoLves 
figurative Language. This distinction is important in 
understanding the roLe of intention in both speech pLay and 
figurative Language: there is intention in a (chiLd's) speech 
pLay act, even if it is not necessariLy conscious or evident, 
whereas intention is often irreLevant in figurative Language 
speech pLay (incLuding metaphor). 
Frame anaLysis has not been appLied to the study of 
chiLdren's speech pLay in pubLished Literature to my knowLedge. 
I took the idea directLy from Goffman's and Bateson's work on 
framing and pLay. The work of Labov on rituaL insuLts 
("sounding") among bLack American teenagers utiLized the concepts 
of frame anaLysis; however much of Labov's work was pubLished 
before the seminaL work on frame anaLysis. Kochman's (1983) 
criticism of Labov's work aLso made onLy Limited use of frame 
anaLysis. That recent anthropoLogists have not appLied frame 
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analysis to children's speech play is related to the general lack 
of analysis by anthropologists of the speech play ethnography. 
Most of the ethnographic analysis accomplished was equivalent to 
the work I presented in the early part of my paper; this 
involved the description and categorization of utterances, and it 
perhaps included a discussion of the work in relation to the 
"equivalent" adult linguistic production. This problematic 
method ignores the issue of a separate children's culture; more 
importantly, it does not consider the (sociolinguistic) context 
and the pragmatic aspects of the speech play act necessary to 
understand children's speech play. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
I have po~nted out spec~f~c d~fferences of methodology and 
results ~n stud~es, ~nclud~ng my own, on ch~ldren's f~gurat~ve 
language. However, most of the recent psycholog~cally-or~ented 
l~terature (~.e. from the 1970s and 1980s) agrees on several 
bas~c ~ssues regard~ng metaphor: 
1) that young ch~ldren possess a capac~ty for metaphor~c 
thought, although they ~nfrequently use ~t, 





pre-school ch~ldren seem to have a h~gh output of 
(though often nonsens~cal) language wh~ch decl~nes 
school and then reemerges in Jun~or h~gh school. 
Although I w~ll d~sagree w~th the conclus~ons and assumptions of 
certa~n spec~f~cs w~th~n these studies, I do agree w~th the f~rst 
two statements presented above. I f~nd fault w~th the last 
statement, on wh~ch I only have the support of one other study 
(W~nner. McCarthy, and Gardner 1980). 
No broad conclusions about ch~ldren's speech play and 
f~gurat~ve language emerges from the anthropological l~terature. 
These stud~es are cross-cultural accounts and examples of var~ous 
aspects of children's speech play. All stud~es concur that 
further ethnograph~c research ~s essent~al. Th~s was a maJor 
mot~vat~on for the methodology of my study. The ex~stent 
anthropolog~cal l~terature ~s useful for the ethnography wh~ch ~t 
provides; however, I feel ~ts theoretical caut~on ~s 
unwarranted: ~f we wait unt~l we have "enough" f~eldwork done 
before draw~ng any conclus~ons, we w~ll s~mply have a large 
collect~on of data w~thout any real understand~ng of the f~eld of 
ch~ldren's speech play. Because of the lack of theoret~cal 
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analysis of the ethnographic data in general. I have articulated 
the theoretical issues on my own. I have worked from ideas that 
were sometimes mentioned in the literature as important issues 
for future study, although without much explication. 
I used the literature which focused on the notions of play 
and frame analysis as a tool for analyzing my data. I have shown 
this to be a useful method of analyzing children's speech play 
conversations. 




discuss the existence and validity of 
the problems of adult categories of 
early metaphor 
metaphor, and 
what system can be used in analyzing children's 
metaphorical utterances. Second, I will reexamine my data to 
draw conclusions concerning metaphor usage among the children, 
the role of creativity, and the social issues and implications 
involved in the children's speech play use. 
The issue of whether or not there is a form of "early 
metaphor 
to what 
marker" that is important for study is directly related 
is defined as metaphor. Asch and Nerlove discussed 
double function terms, taking these as "an elementary instance of 
metaphorical thinking." (1960: 48) The question is not only 
whether these utterances themselves are metaphorical, but whether 
they are prerequisites for more developed, metaphorical thought. 
The terms which Asch and Nerlove used in their studies have been 
considered frozen by some recent critics (e. g. Pollio and Pollio 
1974). Using adult metaphor categorizations, Asch and Nerlove's 
examples are frozen metaphors. Yet these frozen metaphors are 
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not only examples of metaphorical thinking, but they are probably 
necessary steps in metaphorical development. As I have stated 
previously; frozen metaphors 
because the 
are important in terms of 




to them in their conversations. This is primarily 
with metalinguistic, pragmatic devices such as 
differences in intonation, volume, and emphasis. The children 
clearly understand this use of early metaphor in that they also 
play further on them-- "fixing the chair" is a clear example of 
this. 
This is one of the main reasons that adult metaphor 
terminology is not useful in analyzing children's utterances. 
Most researchers ignore frozen metaphor as irrelevant. If frozen 
metaphor was to be accepted as "elementary metaphor", there is 
still the problem of the other two categories of metaphor (i. e. 
conventional and novel metaphor). To reiterate again an obvious 
example first, what is a conventional metaphor to an adult 
listener is quite possibly a novel metaphor to the child 
listener. This was shown by the only example of a conventional 
metaphor used by a child, ·skinny as a rail." Several of the 
children had not heard the metaphor before. Therefore, they had 
to analyze the metaphor as if it were a novel utterance; what 
makes a conventional metaphor conventional is that it is familiar 
to the listener and part of the standard vocabulary of the 
culture. In terms of children's usage of conventional metaphor, 
there is no way to be certain that a child understands the 
metaphor, or whether s/he is simply imitating an adult utterance. 
This could be the explanation for the confused "bald chicken" 
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utterance, although I would guess that it is possible that the 
child understood some other conventional metaphor and had 
difficultly incorporating it into a novel utterancel perhaps the 
conversational frame was also different. 
Looking at this issue from the other side, from the 
children's utterances first instead of the adult categories, we 
can see even more clearly why these categories are invalid. Most 
of the children's utterances, as described in chapter three, do 
not fit into any of the three categories. I do not think that 
this is an issue of whether or not these utterances are 
metaphorical in naturel this has already been proven. Rather, 
it is that the adult metaphorical categories have fuzzy 
boundaries, which is quite obvious as there is often disagreement 
concerning not only what is metaphoric but what type of metaphor 
it is. (Thus the need for a Judging and rating system in many 
metaphorical and psychological testing situations.) The 
children's utterances, in being particularly creative, evidence 
this fuzziness to such a degree that most of them fall somewhere 
between frozen and novel or frozen and conventional metaphor. On 
the other hand, the adult categories of metaphor are defined 
according to both the amount of their usage and their retention 
of metaphoricity: that is, novel metaphors, on one end of the 
scale, have not been used often and are very metaphorical; 
frozen metaphors, on the other end of the scale, have been used 
frequently and are no longer considered metaphorical. Thus if I 
were to chart out these standard categories of metaphor, I would 
order them: novel-- conventional-- frozen. So one might think 
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that the fuzziness would occur between conventional and frozen or 
between conventional and novel. But these differences are clear 
in the children's utterances. Frozen and conventional utterances 
are generally the most difficult to determine, especially in 
adult speech. It is the novel and frozen fuzziness that is the 
most difficult to interpret. This is not because the children's 
utterances are nonsensical-- the nonsensical utterances were 
analyzed separately. 
frozen metaphor is 
It is simply because this 





understanding the utterance or the metaphor involved. 
It would be convenient if we did not need to categorize 
these utterances at all, and if we simply recognized their 
metaphoricity. 
of data, some 
However, especially when analyzing a large amount 
sort of organization is necessary. As I have 
shown, it is necessary to change the focus of the grounds for 
classification. I would suggest the following groupings 
according to the degree of sophistication of the metaphor in 
regard to the capacity for a double meaning: 1) elementary 
metaphors-- that involve simple duplicate meaning terms 
(including synaesthetic adJectives), 2) secondary metaphors that 
involve playing on simple duplicate meaning terms, and 3) prime 
metaphors that create new duplicate meaning terms (i.e. novel). 
These duplicate meaning terms are equivalent to the early 
metaphor markers which I have been discussing (e. g. 'sign'). 
The ability to understand that words can have different meanings 
is fundamental to metaphor, which is a play on this notion of 
dual meanings while crossing semantic boundaries. 
Most of the children's metaphorical utterances were 
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elementary metaphors. These metaphors may still be used as 
speech play, but they require only the recognition of a duplicate 
meaning. This category would include many metaphors which are 
standardly termed frozen, although these terms are not 
interchangeable by any means. 
Some of the children's utterances were secondary metaphors. 
These are somewhat more sophisticated utterances, as there are 
two levels of playing involved: 
and then a play on that metaphor. 
the basic elementary metaphor, 
The speech play, described in 
chapter three, in which a boy responded to my statement, 
sitting at the head,· with ·You're at the feet," is a 
example of a secondary metaphor. This required not only 




also a further playing on the meaning. Another example is the 
various uses of the word ·sick"; we had been discussing the word 
in one context, and the children played on its use in relation to 
a second context. 
Prime metaphors were rare among the children's utterances. 
These metaphors 
metaphors could 
involve is novel. 
are not only novel utterances (as secondary 
also be novel), but the duplicity which they 
C's "trumpet sink" metaphor is prime. The 
complex relationship between the sink and a trumpet which is 
inVOlved in the invention (and comprehension) of this utterance 
is highly sophisticated; this is a relationship that does not 
usually exist. Thus, C created a prime metaphor. 
My study has shown that first grade children (i. e. six and 
seven year olds) have metaphoric capabilities. They both use and 
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comprehend metaphors as out~ined above. The chi~dren's 
metaphoric capabi~ities are not as sophisticated as an adu~ts' in 
regard to adu~t, standard metaphor usage. I have on~y focused on 
one age group, so I cannot substantiate a deve~opmenta~ c~aim for 
younger or o~der chi~dren, except by referring to other studies. 
In this vein, we must admit that if first grade chi~dren are 
showing a fair~y sophisticated ~eve~ of chi~dren's metaphor, then 
there must be some metaphoric capabi~ities attributed to even 
younger chi~dren. I have argued for the importance of doub~e 
function and doub~e meaning terms and the existence of ·ear~y 
metaphor markers·. Thus I wou~d argue that there is probab~y an 
understanding of these types of ear~y metaphor in pre-schoo~ 
chi~dren. In terms of o~der chi~dren. a~~ ~anguage development 
studies have shown that metaphoric (and other figurative 
language) capabi~ities are indeed deve~opmenta~ processes, and 
thus older chi~dren can be expected to possess a more 
sophisticated ~eve~ of metaphoric understanding and use. We can 
a~so expect o~der chi~dren, by their ~onger exposure to adu~t 
(~anguage) cu~ture. to deve~op adu~t metaphorica~ usage and thus 
begin to use conventiona~ metaphors (and c~ich~s) more 
frequent~y. 
As I have been discussing the development of metaphor in 
first grade children and o~der, I must a~so address the question 
of metaphoric production dec~ine in e~ementary schoo~. Kany of 
the ~eading researchers in the fie~d have suggested this (e.g. 
Bi~~ow 1975, 1977; Gardner, Kircher, Winner, and Perkins 1975) 
and it has only been cha~lenged by Winner, KcCarthy, and Gardner 
(1980). I have shown that at ~east at the beginning of e~ementary 
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school, there is still an abundance of metaphor production. 
There is a problem with educational practices today in terms 
of encouraging both creativity and the use of creative language 
(as will be discussed further below). However, the hypothetical 
decline in metaphoric production probably does not exist. This 
decline in metaphoric production was posited using standard, 
adult metaphorical terms; these terms are not valid in analyzing 
chldren's speech production and comprehension, as this section 
began 
well 
by demonstrating. and thus it is not valid to discuss how 
children perform using these terms. Perhaps children's 
production of adult metaphor does decrease in elementary school. 
Until a study has proven that their metaphor production in terms 
of children's language culture has declined, I am inclined to 
believe that the tendencies shown in this present study will 
continue, and that children throughout elementary school make use 
of sophisticated metaphorical language. 
Creativity necessarily plays a large role in speech play and 
figurative language output and understanding. It has generally 
been assumed that speech play and the use of figurative 
are expressions of creativity, and that they 
language 
are also 
neccessities for creative language and thought development. 
The role of individual variation in terms of creativity in 
figurative language and speech play is also raised in my work. 
In my study, I was working with twenty-four children, a 
relatively small sample. It is still possible to make 
generalizations and draw conclusions from such a study. However. 
I have been cautious because in this small sample I found a great 
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deal of individual variation. Most of this is more relevant to 
the discussion of social issues. But it is still important to 
point out that, 
examples of 
although a fair number of the children 
speech play and figurative language, 
produced 
a few 
individuals clearly stood out in this regard. This is 
necessarily true of any study of individual abilities, as not all 
children (or adults) have the same level of language 
capabilities. These individual differences were especially 
apparent in my study because its methodological reliance on a 
natural discourse setting as opposed to a psychological testing 
situation; in the latter every subJect has an equal chance of 
displaying their metaphorical and figurative language knowledge, 
whereas in my study there are other (social) factors operating so 
that the children were essentially competing to display their 
knowledge and to involve themselves in the conversation. An 
example of this is that shy or quiet children do not participate 
in speech play exchanges as much as more outspoken, 
children. 
aggressive 
The effect of standard educational practices on the creative 
language abilities of the young child must be examined. It first 
must be considered that this proJect was done within a 
traditional classroom, as opposed to an open classroom. The term 
"traditional", as applied to the classroom, has changed over the 
years. The children were required to do specific work at certain 
times, but they were also given some freedom and choice in terms 
of how to accomplish this work, both independently and in small 
groups; much of this is simply a result of one teacher's 
inability to teach twenty-four children at different levels at 
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the same time. My presence in the classroom was both very 
help£ul to the teacher and a di££erent experience £or the 
children in their work situation. Suddenly they were receiving 
more individual attention than they usually did. I would not be 
surprised i£ the sheer quantity as well as quality o£ speech play 
that I discovered was higher than the same teacher would have 
encountered in the classroom had she been looking £or it. This 
is not to suggest that individual attention alone will promote 
speech play. But speech play must be encouraged in order to be 
promoted; i£ speech play is discouraged. it will cease to exist. 
The individual attention that I provided did encourage speech 
play; many educational practices. exempli£ied and rein£orced by 
having to work in large groups. discourage speech play. 
There are de£initely instances o£ routine exercises which 
sti£le creativity. even i£ they are unintentional. One example 
is obvious: when a teacher is testing a child's understanding o£ 
reading material, s/he will o£ten ask the student questions which 
are designed £or the student to simply regurgitate the material. 
I£ that is not done. the answer is incorrect. There£ore, this 
exercise rein£orces non-creative thinking and 
unwittingly giving the student the messag.e "This 




This issue has o£ten been raised by teachers and educators 
speci£ically concerned that creative writing is not encouraging 
creativity. In this process students learn very early in their 
educational experience not only what is required o£ them, but 
they also learn to only £ul£ill those requirements in a set, sa£e 
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way (Pollio and Pollio 1974: 198; Gardner, Kircher, Winner, and 
Perkins 1975: 140). 
An example from my data also supports these complaints. The 
children were constructing sentences, using vocabulary words from 
a story which they had recently read; one of the vocabulary words 
was the name 'Dan'. The children had been constructing varied, 
creative sentences, including the boy (Q) in this exchange: 
OW: O.k., Q, it's your turn. 
Q: (he picks a card) Dan. 
OW: Can you tell me a sentence or a story with 'Dan' in it? 
Q: (with no hesitation) Dan can playa game. 
The sentence that Q told the group was not a sentence that he had 
thought of on his own; it was a sentence from the story which 
they had read. 
There seemed to be very distinctive sexual differentiation 
in terms of which kinds of figurative language and speech play 
different speakers used. One girl (B) produced all of the sing-
song utterances. This relation of sing-song utterances with 
girls might be because sing-songs are probably related to Jump-
rope rhymes, which are traditionally a female form of play. The 
sing-songs in my study did appear to be original utterances, but 
this does not rule out the influence of traditional games. 
All of the examples of rhyme and homonym usage were produced 
by boys except for two examples from the same girl mentioned 
above (B), and these rhymes were part of her sing-songs. 
Except for one work group composed of all boys, and one 
group composed of only two girls, most of the groups were fairly 
balanced, including perhaps two boys and one girl one time and an 
extra girl at another time. Yet metaphor production was 
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dominated by ma~es: o£ the £ourteen overt metaphors (those 
described in the body o£ this paper), e~even were uttered by six 
di££erent boys and three were uttered by one gir~ (L). Not on~y 
did the boys dominate the £igurative ~anguage domain, but in 
genera~ they dominated the conversations; since in a~most a~~ 
cases the boys spoke more o£ten than the gir~s, on a quantitative 
basis it is not surprising that the boys a~so used more 
£igurative ~anguage. It is interesting to note that in the on~y 
group that was entire~y £ema~e, one o£ the two metaphorica~ 
utterances by a gir~ occurred in that work session. 
There is a~so individua~ variation to take into account: 
there were certain individua~s who were more dominant speakers, 
who both spoke more o£ten and tended to use £igurative ~anguage 
more o£ten. For the most part these two were corre,~ated; one 
boy in particu~ar (D) both spoke the most and used the most 
£igurative ~anguage. (He a~so was the dominant speech p~ay £rame 
setter £or the one c~ear examp~e o£ a speech p~ay interaction 
described in chapter £our.) One gir~ (B) spoke the most and was 
a~so one o£ the most aggressive chi~dren. She a~so per£ormed the 
sing-songs and the rhymes. However, the on~y gir~ who used 
metaphorica~ ~anguage (L) is a shy, sensitive gir~; she is o£ten 
£air~y quiet, but when she does ta~k she is usua~~y very sharp. 
Basica~~y, boys dominate the £ie~d o£ £igurative ~anguage 
and speech p~ay. It seems that since it is an unusua~ event £or 
a gir~ in these situations to engage in speech p~ay and 
£igurative ~anuguage, it a~so takes an unusua~. perhaps adaptive 
persona~ity £or a gir~ to accomp~ish this act. L's unusua~ 
combination o£ passivity and yet bo~dness exemp~i£ies this we~~. 
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In terms of power and authority assertions being a part of speech 
play, it is not surprising that boys are dominant in this area. 
Yet one of the ways that the children assert themselves in speech 
play is in the usage of "dirty·, taboo language, and this is best 
exemplified in both the sing-songs and other utterances by B. I 
think she (B) is another example of an unusual person who in this 
case found it possible to get involved in speech play in an 
aggressive manner • 
There did not seem to be any racial differentiation in 
speech play and figurative language use among the boys. The most 
prominant male speaker was white (D), and quantitative analysis 
of the number of productions would provide a false impression 
that speech play and figurative language usage was much more 
common among whites. However, there was an even split of usage 
among black and white speakers (as reflects the composition of 
the class), and aside from the one boy mentioned above, each boy 
produced one or two utterances. 
As mentioned above, only two girls engaged in the use of 
obvious speech play or figurative language. These two were both 
black. However, because of the evident sexual differentiation 
and the lack of racial differentiation among the boys, I consider 
this fact irrelevant. I am particularly concerned here with the 
size of my sample; with more data to work with, I would consider 
expanding the notion of why certain girls would engage in speech 
play to why certain black girls would engage in speech play. 
Following my earlier explanation, it would be interesting to see 
if the requirements for female assertion in a male-dominated 
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situation were more prevalent among blacks than among whites. 
Speech play and £igurative language involve bending and 
breaking rules. On the one hand, this re£ers to linguistic rules 
that are manipulated through the actual execution o£ these acts. 
On the other hand, this re£ers to social rules that are 
manipulated because the speech act has been accomplished. Speech 
play is a means o£ breaking social rules in a socially acceptable 
manner. It is an expression o£ power, or perhaps lack thereo£, 
as it is a means o£ asserting domination in a sphere where that 
power can not usually be expressed (or does not exist). 
Again, it may be questioned whether a speech play act is an 
intentional act. It is an intentional act, although the intent 
may vary. In terms o£ speech play involving committing a 
socially unacceptable act in a socially acceptable way, intention 
is irrelevant. It eXists, but it may be so socially ingrained 
that it is unconscious-- is that then intentional? In a more 
general context, I do think that play £or the sake o£ play (c£. 
Cazden 1974) exists in the use o£ £igurative language. This is 
not an explanation in itsel£, however. Even ·play £or the sake 
o£ play· exists at some times and in some certain situations and 
not in others, and exactly when and why this happens is 
important. Although the intent itsel£ may be unconscious, the 
use of speech play and £igurative language is a very conscious, 
intentional act. 
Why study children's speech play and figurative language? 
For one thing, the many unanswered questions which I have 
presented are important to understanding children's speech play 
and figurative language, and to understanding these activities in 
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adults. The real question is, why is it important to understand 
these activities better, particularly among children? Childhood 
speech play and figurative language may be essential to fully 
developed and creative thought and language. If it is not 
essential, use of this kind of language would still indicate a 
higher level of creativity and more elaborate thought processes. 
It has also been suggested that speech play capabilities in 
a child would later affect, as an adult, his/her 
capacity to understand the social and natural world and the 
place of oneself and others within it. (Dunn 1980: 211) 
It is important, then, both to evaluate how current teaching 
processes affect speech play and figurative language, and to 
construct new methods that would better stimulate creative 
thinking. Lastly, by recognizing the social implications both of 
the use of speech play and figurative language and how it is 
currently being used, we can take action within the educational 
system to change the socialization which occurs in our society. 
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APPENDIX 
This is an excerpt from a reading group with two boys and a gir1. 
It was the beginning of a story about a boy who was sick and 
cou1d on1y sit inside and 100k out the window. From this I tried 
to encourage the chi1dren to make up sentences (as I was a1ways 
doing) from various beginnings such as "He saw some. • <The 
excerpts that are readings from the book are in b01dface> 
1 D; He saw sOme ••••• 
2 J; Things. 
3 DW; Shh .••• 
4 D: Some boys and gir1s. 
5 DW; Next 1ine, R? 
6 R; And they cou1dn't come in. 
7 DW: Right, you skipped a 1ine: But he cou1dn't go out and 
8 they cou1dn't come in. Why cou1dn't he go out? Who knows? 
9 D: He's sick! 
10 DW; He's sick. 
11 J: (und) 
What do you have to do when you're sick? 
12 R; You have to 1ay down and eat something icky. 
13 UN: (und) 
14 D; We11, I go for the candybars when I'm sick. 
15 (1aughter) 
16 UN: (und) 
17 DW: What did it say that he saw? What did Teddy see? 
18 J & R; Boys and gir1s. 
19 D: (und--cack1ing) 
20 DW: What e1se do you think, 
21 saw some •••• ' ••. what? 
if the sentence Just said, •• 'He 
22 D; -one. (simu1taneous1yafter 'some') 
23 DW: He saw someone. What e1se? Just if he 
24 100king out the window, what e1se cou1d he 
25 some •••• ' 
were maybe 
do .•• 'He saw 
26 D: He see the 01d 1ady getting run over by a big o1d rig and 
27 goes WHAPI 
28 R: (1aughs) 
29 J: He didn't have to say that. 
30 DW: You can make up sentences, but you can also stay in your 
31 seat and be a 1itt1e quieter. R, can you think of 
32 something e1se? 'He saw some ••• ' 
33 R: Games 
34 D: Big one. (simu1taneously with R) 
35 DW: He saw some games. 
36 UN: He saw up. 
37 DW: 'He saw some ••• ' 
38 D: Gir1s. 
39 UN: (und) 
40 J & D: 
41 know ••• 
(und) I know something he seen. I know ..• Oh I 
42 DW: (simu1taneous1y with J) Is there something e1se he cou1d 
43 have seen? Just think ..•• shhhh 
44 J: Peop1e. 
45 DW: He saw some peop1e. D? 
46 D: He saw some good-1ooking gir1s. (1aughs as do others) 
47 DW: Ah, did he? (a11 sti11 1aughing) 
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48 DW: What if, instead of it saying, 'He saw some .•. " it said 
49 'He heard some ... ' Can you think of something we cou1d fi11 
50 D: (immediate1y) He heard some good-100king gir1s. (a11 
51 1aughl 
52 DW: He heard them? How cou1d he hear that they were good-
53 10oking? (1aughing) Does that make sense? 
54 R: Yeah ••. (und) 
55 D: You can te11. (1aughs) ••• You can te11 they're good-
56 100king. 
57 DW: Let's try to think, what cou1d it say... 'He heard 
58 some ••• 'R, can you think of some way to end that 
59 sentence? 
60 R: He heard some voices. 
61 DW: He heard some voices. What e1se cou1d he hear some ..• 
62 D: He heard some good-100king gir1s! (1aughs) 
63 DW: Now D, 1et's have a new sentencel that doesn't make 
64 much sense ••• 
65 D: He heard (und). (A11 1augh) 
66 DW: What about 'He heard some ••• '? 
67 D: He heard someone with (und ••.• I think same as above •••• a11 
68 1augh) 
69 DW: You really 1ike that, don't you? (I guess I understood it 
70 at the time--maybe he was sti11 saying 'good-looking gir1s') 
71 J: He heard somebody crying. 
72 DW: He heard somebody crying. What about he heard 
73 some ••• dogs? Did he hear some dogs? 
74 (All say 'yeah!') 
75 D: Stupid dogs! (1aughs ..• und) 
76 DW: Let,'s turn the page. Who wants to read first? 
77 D: Not me, that's for sure. (a11 1augh) 
78 DW: Shhh. R wi11 read first. Go ahead. Everybody watch 
79 in their books. 
80 R&D: Teddy 
81 DW: Shhh 
82 D: Teddy saw some good-100king gir1s •.•• (a11 1augh) 
83 DW: R ••• (all sti11 1aughing .•• so I start a 1ittle too) 
84 Now don't 1augh. (as they continue) Ok, everybody's 1aughed? 
85 A1right. we've 1aughed enough. (still Joking1y, ••• )Now we're 
86 going to read. 
87 (und) 
88 DW: What did Teddy do next? 
89 R: Teddy 100ked out of the window,., 
90 DW: Does the sentence end there? Now R, look, it says 
91 Teddy looked out of the window--is there a period at the end 
92 of that? 
93 R & UN: No! 
94 DW: That's not the end of the sentence. Read the next 1ine--
95 I want everyone e1se to be quiet. 
96 R: and saw ••• (und) 
97 DW: Good. Who's going to read the next 1ine? J, read the 
98 next 1ine. 
99 J: They went up and down the street. 
100 DW: And what's the 1ast 1ine D? 
101 J: But ••• 
102 D: But 
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103 OW: Shhh ••• 
104 (0 sounding out word) 
105 0: But not Teddy. 
106 J: But not Teddy. 
107 0: (und) some good-100king gir1s! 
108 OW: Can you read the first 1ine? 
109 0: Some people went out 
110 OW: No ••• went ••• 
111 0: in-to the store. 
112 OW: Ok, can you read the next 1ine R, we're on the second 
113 line. 
114 0: But good-looking girls •.• 
115 OW: Shh, but what? 
116 <laughter) 
117 R: But not Teddy. 
118 OW: But not Teddy. Why not Teddy? J, why not Teddy? 
119 J: Teddy, w •• a ••. 
120 0: (und) ..• he's going to run over that old lady •.• here's that 
121 01d lady ••• go ••• 
122 OW: Shhh. Teddy was what ••. ? I want to hear from J. 
123 Teddy was ••• 
124 O(R?): He was too fat! (R & 0 laugh; mumb1ing) 
125 OW: No •••• 
126 0: He was happy 'cause the good-looking girls ••• 
127 OW: 0, let's stick to what we're doing here. R ••• 
128 R: He was sick. (starts coughing/miming sick) 
129 OW: Right. And what's the last 1ine, O? 
130 J: And he didn't .••• 
131 0: And he didn't (then with J:) like it. 
132 OW: Do you like being sick? 
133 0: Yeah! 
134 J & R: (und--yelling--a 'no' somewhere in there) 
1350: I miss school and I hate school. I hate to go ••• (noise) 
136 UN: I know ••• 
137 OW: Shhhh 
138 0: I hate school, it's the worst thing in the world. 
139 R: I like school. 
140 OW: I don't like being sick ••• 
141 UN: I hate ••• 
142 OW: ••• but you don't get to play if you're really sick. 
143 0: Yeah, but (I insert a 'shhh' since he's screaming) you 
144 miss school and I hate school. 
145 OW: Why--1 think it's fun--you get to play some games ••• 
146 0: And anyways you can meet them good-looking girls. 
147 OW: Ah, you can meet some good-100king girls. Ahuh, come 
148 on ••• 
149 (mumbles) 
150 0: But not you J. 
151 OW: Shhh 
152 R: (und) 
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